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I. INTRODUCTION
In a series of articles published from 1980 to 1992, literary theorists
Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels advocated what I will call
“strong intentionalism,” the thesis that the meaning of a text is identical
to the meaning that its author intended it to communicate.1 At the recent
Conference on Legal Interpretation in San Diego, they vigorously defended
this thesis. I will argue that their defense of strong intentionalism fails,
and that the thesis is false.
* Professor of Law, Monash University, Australia.
1. The thesis and all the arguments considered throughout this Paper apply
equally to sounds and gestures, as well as marks, that might be thought to be meaningful.
It is merely for the sake of convenience that I will examine the relevant issues mainly by
discussing texts, authors, and readers.
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Knapp and Michaels defend strong intentionalism mainly by arguing
that there can be no such thing as “intentionless meaning,” in other
words, that nothing can be meaningful which was not intended by some
purposeful intelligence to be meaningful. That argument has been subjected
to powerful criticism, but I will assume that it is sound.2 My objection is
that it does not establish strong intentionalism in any event. At best, the
argument proves that intention is a necessary condition for meaning. It
does not prove that it is a sufficient condition. I will argue that intention
alone is not sufficient for a text to be meaningful—something else is
needed as well—and that consequently, intention and meaning are not
identical.
Against strong intentionalism I will defend “moderate intentionalism,”
which holds that authorial intention is necessary but not sufficient for
textual meaning. Moderate intentionalists hold that an author may
intend his text to mean something, but fail to give it that, or perhaps any,
meaning. For a text to mean what its author intended it to mean, it is
necessary that its intended audience be capable of ascertaining its
intended meaning. This requires that the audience have access to persuasive
evidence of that meaning, provided partly by the conventional meaning
of the text and partly by other clues of the author’s intention, such as the
context in which it was written. If the audience does not have access to
such evidence, then not only will the author’s attempt to communicate
his intention fail, but the text will not mean what he intended it to mean.
And that is to say that his intention alone is neither sufficient for, nor
identical to, the meaning of the text.
II. THREE THEORIES OF MEANING
Someone attempting to interpret a text is attempting to ascertain its
meaning. Philosophers and linguists distinguish between different kinds
of meanings, although they disagree over how many there are and what
they should be called. Which of these kinds of meaning should
interpreters be attempting to reveal? To facilitate discussion, I will use
the following labels:
Conventionalism, or nonintentionalism, is the thesis that the true
meaning of a text is constituted by its sentence meaning. Sentence
meaning is the meaning a sentence in a language has by itself,
excluding all information about the context or contexts in which
it is uttered.3 In other words, it is the meaning it derives solely
2. For criticism, see, for example, John R. Searle, Literary Theory and Its
Discontents, 25 NEW LITERARY HIST. 637 (1994).
3. Knapp and Michaels might object that nothing can have a meaning by itself,
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from the semantic and syntactic conventions of the language in
question, and it is therefore independent of its author’s intentions.
Strong intentionalism is the thesis that the true meaning of a text
is its speaker’s meaning. Speaker’s meaning is the meaning that
the utterer of a sentence intends his utterance of it to
communicate, which may be quite different from its sentence
meaning.
Moderate intentionalism is the thesis that the true meaning of a
text is its utterance meaning. Utterance meaning is what the
speaker’s meaning appears to be, given all the evidence that is
readily available to his intended audience, which may include the
sentence meaning of the utterance and other clues such as its
context.
What is the practical difference between strong and moderate
intentionalism? Strong intentionalists hold that a text means what its
author intended it to mean. But obviously no one except the author
herself has direct, unmediated access to her intentions. Others must rely
on whatever evidence of her intentions is available to them. How, then,
does this differ from moderate intentionalism? The difference is that
moderate intentionalists regard only a certain kind of evidence of an
author’s intention as relevant to the meaning of her text. The evidence
must have been readily available to her intended audience.
Suppose that on the basis of all the evidence readily available to them,
both textual and contextual, members of the speaker’s intended audience
interpret her text to mean x, but much later it is discovered by her
biographer that she wrote in her private diary that she intended the text
to mean y. Is the meaning of the text x or y? Assume that there is
enough other evidence to justify accepting the reliability of the diary
entry. Moderate intentionalists, who take textual meaning to be utterance
meaning, would say that the meaning of the text is x, notwithstanding the
discovery of the diary entry, because evidence of the author’s intention
which is not readily available to her intended audience is irrelevant. But
considered apart from any context of utterance, derived solely from linguistic
conventions. Nothing that has not actually been uttered can have any meaning, and
linguistic conventions contribute to meaning only if a speaker or author intended them to
do so. To avoid that objection, let me stipulate that by “sentence” I mean words uttered
with the intention that they mean something. I am therefore not using the term “sentence
meaning” in its usual philosophical sense.
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strong intentionalists, who take textual meaning to be speaker’s
meaning, would say that the meaning of the text is y, and that readers
prior to the biographer’s discovery misinterpreted it.
Another example of the practical difference between strong and
moderate intentionalism can be found in law, which Knapp and Michaels
have often discussed. When interpreting a statute, British courts traditionally
refused to consider, as evidence of its intended meaning, what was said
in parliamentary debates during its passage.4 They regarded this
information as irrelevant to the meaning of the statute, partly because it
was not readily available to the general public or even to most lawyers.
On the other hand, they were always willing to take into account the
circumstances in which the statute was passed, and its purpose, in so far
as these are, or were at that time, common knowledge.5 They were
moderate intentionalists rather than conventionalists. Now, if they had
adopted strong intentionalism, they might still have refused to consider
what was said in parliamentary debates as evidence of statutory
meaning, but not for the same reason. They might have rejected it on the
ground that it is unreliable as evidence of the legislature’s intended
meaning, but not on the ground that it is in any event irrelevant to the
meaning of the statute because it is not readily available to the
legislature’s intended audience.
III. STRONG VERSUS MODERATE INTENTIONALISM
Knapp and Michaels defend intentionalism against conventionalism.
“All our arguments,” they say, “have been anti-conventionalist—which
is to say, intentionalist.”6 Indeed, they think that the truth of intentionalism
follows from the falsity of conventionalism: “Our insistence in ‘Against
Theory’ that language is always intentional is no more than the positive
side of the denial that preexisting forms, rules, or conventions are
essential conditions of language.”7 But although they distinguish “strong
conventionalism” from “moderate conventionalism,”8 they overlook the
4. American courts followed this approach until the twentieth century, when they
began to admit such evidence. In Pepper v. Hart, [1993] 1 All E.R. 42 (H.L.), British
courts finally followed suit.
5. See, e.g., ELMER A. DRIEDGER, CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 149–51 (2d ed.
1983); P. ST. J. LANGAN, MAXWELL ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 48 (12th ed.
1969); SIR PETER BENSON MAXWELL, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 20–21
(photo. reprint 1991) (1875).
6. Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Against Theory 2: Hermeneutics and
Deconstruction, 14 CRITICAL INQUIRY 49, 67 (1987); see also id. at 60.
7. Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, A Reply to Richard Rorty: What Is
Pragmatism?, in AGAINST THEORY: LITERARY STUDIES AND THE NEW PRAGMATISM 139,
145 n.1 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1985); see also Knapp & Michaels, supra note 6, at 67.
8. Knapp & Michaels, supra note 6, at 67.
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existence of rival versions of intentionalism, and erroneously assume
that strong intentionalism is the only alternative to conventionalism.9
One indication of this assumption is that Knapp and Michaels treat
speaker’s meaning and utterance meaning as identical, which is a common
failing in the philosophical literature as well.10 For example, after discussing
an example of a speaker unintentionally misleading his audience, they
deny that it is an instance of “a speaker failing to mean what the speaker
intends.”11 And of course it is not: what a speaker means simply is, as
they claim, what the speaker intends. But the question is whether or not
a speaker’s utterance can fail to mean what the speaker intends.
Knapp and Michaels concede that what is essential to meaning is
“giving clues to your intention,” or “signaling what you intend.”12 But
what if a speaker fails to give accurate clues, or signals, of his intention?
Is the meaning of his utterance still the meaning he intended it to have,
or the meaning it appears to his intended audience to have, given the
clues and signals he has provided? Knapp and Michaels insist that it is
the former. But that seems to be due to their assumption that the only
alternative to strong intentionalism is conventionalism—that if meaning
is not determined by the speaker’s intention, it must be determined by
linguistic conventions.
Consider the following passage:
Conventions are indeed important, but only because they often provide
convenient ways of signaling what you intend. They don’t add to, subtract
from, or alter your meaning; they simply help you express the meaning you
intend. And if the conventions don’t help you express the meaning you
intend—if, for example, you use the wrong conventions—they don’t replace
your meaning with some other meaning. Your meaning doesn’t become a
different meaning when you fail to express the meaning you intended. If it did,
if speech acts were indeed conventional acts and not just acts that sometimes
employed conventions, then Derrida would be right: intention would be
inadequate to determine meaning. But Derrida is wrong. Speech acts are not
conventional acts, and if they mean anything at all they mean only what their
authors intend.13

9. “The only alternative to the intentionalism of ‘Against Theory’ is a formalism
that imagines the possibility not of two different kinds of intended meaning but of
meaning that is not intended at all.” Knapp & Michaels, supra note 7, at 142.
10. For honorable exceptions, see Jerrold Levinson, Intention and Interpretation:
A Last Look, in INTENTION AND INTERPRETATION 221, 222–23 (Gary Iseminger ed., 1992);
William E. Tolhurst, On What a Text Is and How It Means, 19 BRIT. J. AESTHETICS 3 (1979).
11. Knapp & Michaels, supra note 6, at 64.
12. Id. at 66.
13. Id. at 66–67.
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This passage clearly displays the assumption I am challenging. First, it
conflates utterance meaning—what “speech acts” mean—and speaker’s
meaning. The important question concerns the relationship between the
conventions you use and the meaning of your speech act, and not the
relationship between those conventions and “your meaning,” that is, the
meaning you are attempting to express. The question is whether, if you
“use the wrong conventions” to express your intentions, the meaning of
your speech act is different from the meaning you intended to express. It
is of course true that your meaning is not different from the meaning you
intended to express: your meaning just is the meaning you intended to
express, whether or not you succeeded in doing so. But what about the
meaning of your utterance? Surely if you fail to express the meaning
you intended to express, then the meaning you do express must be
different from the meaning you intended. And surely the meaning of
your utterance—the meaning of your speech act—is the meaning you do
express.14 (At one point in Against Theory, Knapp and Michaels write
that “[m]eaning is just another name for expressed intention.”15 But an
author’s expressed intention is not necessarily the intention he intended
to express.) Therefore, surely the meaning of your utterance can differ
from the meaning you intended to express. But if so, then strong
intentionalism is false.
A second feature of the lengthy passage quoted which displays the
assumption I am challenging can be found in the reason Knapp and
Michaels give for insisting that “your meaning doesn’t become a
different meaning when you fail to express the meaning you intended.”
That reason is given in the following sentence: “If it did, if speech acts
were indeed conventional acts and not just acts that sometimes employ
conventions, then Derrida would be right: intention would be inadequate
to determine meaning.” Now, this equates the view that Knapp and
Michaels reject—the view that the meaning you express can differ from
the meaning you intended to express—with conventionalism. That
equation is mistaken because it overlooks moderate intentionalism. One
can believe that use of the wrong conventions can give a speech act a
meaning different from the speaker’s intended meaning, without being
committed to the belief that the meaning of the speech act is determined
entirely by conventions. This is because of what Knapp and Michaels
14. I am using “express” here, as I take Knapp and Michaels to be using it, to
include “imply.” The distinction between express and implied meaning is irrelevant here.
15. Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Against Theory, in AGAINST THEORY:
LITERARY STUDIES AND THE NEW PRAGMATISM 11, 30 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1985); see
also id. at 21 (“[L]inguistic meaning is always identical to expressed intention.”); Knapp
& Michaels, supra note 7, at 141 (“[O]ur position [regards] a text as the expression of its
author’s intention . . . .”).
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themselves concede, that what is essential to meaning are “clues” or
“signals” of the speaker’s intentions, whether those clues consist of his
apparent use of conventions or of something else. If those clues do not
help him express the meaning he intends—if he provides the wrong
clues—then the meaning of his utterance differs from the meaning he
intends. This allows the moderate intentionalist to answer Knapp and
Michaels’s rhetorical question, “if the interest of verbal meaning reduces
to an interest in clues to what an author intends, what sense is there in
appealing to the notion of verbal meaning as a way of going beyond
authorial intention?”16 There is sense in such an appeal because what
verbal meaning and other clues suggest an author intended may not be
the same as what the author really intended, and utterance meaning is
determined by the former rather than the latter.
Knapp and Michaels consistently elide this distinction, as in the
following passage:
What Simon calls “contextual justification,” then, is nothing more than evidence
of the author’s intention, and when we invoke context (as, I have argued, we
always do) we are, by the same token, always invoking the author’s intention.17

Within a single sentence Michaels slides from “evidence of the author’s
intention” to “the author’s intention,” without noticing the difference.
Knapp and Michaels at one point acknowledge that speakers can fail
to produce the speech act they intended to produce. They write that,
“You can intend to say something but fail to produce any sound at all,
or . . . fail to produce the right sound.”18 But nothing comes of this because,
as usual, they are thinking of their opponents as conventionalists, and the
acknowledgement does not advance the cause of conventionalism. They
say that “neither of these failures has anything to do with convention;
you have simply failed to do what you intended. . . . The risk of such
failures is essential not to conventional acts but to acts in general.”19
That, of course, is true, but it does not vindicate strong intentionalism. If
by failing to produce the “right sound” someone can fail to utter sounds
16. Knapp & Michaels, supra note 6, at 57; see also Steven Knapp & Walter Benn
Michaels, Intention, Identity, and the Constitution: A Response to David Hoy, in LEGAL
HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 187, 190, 192 (Gregory Leyh ed.,
1992).
17. Walter Benn Michaels, Response to Perry and Simon, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 673,
676 (1985).
18. Knapp & Michaels, supra note 6, at 65.
19. Id.
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which mean what he intended them to mean, then the meaning of the
sounds he utters—which is to say, the meaning of his utterance—is not
what he intends it to be.
In Against Theory 2, Knapp and Michaels discuss an example that
Jonathan Culler took to demonstrate that the meaning of an utterance can
differ from the meaning intended by the speaker. Imagine that after
apparently getting married, the groom claims that he was joking when he
said “I do.” Even if that really was his intention, Culler argued, it would
not change the meaning of what he said in uttering those words: he made
the requisite promise even if he did not intend to.20 Moderate intentionalists
should agree with Culler on this point: because the meaning of the
groom’s utterance is determined by evidence of his intended meaning
that is readily available to his audience, then if when he said “I do” there
was no evidence available to those present of his intention to make a
joke, his utterance of those words did not constitute the making of a joke
(not even a bad one). At best, it constituted an attempt to make a joke.
Knapp and Michaels deny that this is an example of the meaning of a
speech act not being determined by the speaker’s intention. But they
agree that the groom should be held to have gotten married. According
to them, he is quite properly treated as if he made the requisite promise,
even though he did not really do so. People can justifiably be bound by
promises they appear to make because otherwise contracts would be
unenforceable: parties could always claim later that they did not really
intend to enter into them, and it would be impossible to prove that they
did. In other words, Knapp and Michaels conclude, the reason for
treating the groom as having gotten married is social, not linguistic: it
has “nothing to do with the relation between meaning and intention.”21
This argument is not persuasive. It may at least partly be motivated
by their assumption that the only alternative to strong intentionalism is
conventionalism. They begin their discussion of the example by denying
that the intentions of participants in marriage ceremonies are “in
principle irrelevant,” because “[t]he whole point of a marriage ceremony
is to provide a framework for declaring and carrying out certain
intentions . . . .”22 But that would not be disputed by a moderate
intentionalist who accepts Culler’s conclusion. Of course the intentions
of the participants are not irrelevant. The point is that they are relevant
only insofar as evidence of them is readily available to the participants’
intended audience, and in particular to those required by law to conduct
and witness the marriage ceremony.
20.
21.
22.
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Knapp and Michaels’s distinction between social and linguistic reasons
for holding the groom to be bound by his words is dubious. The
supposed social reason applies not only to contractual promises, but to
the vast majority of utterances that people make. It is generally, and not
exceptionally, true that people are held responsible for what they appear
to have said, regardless of what they may have intended to say.
(Moderate intentionalists, of course, hold that what someone appears to
have said, in the light of all the evidence readily available to his intended
audience, is what he did say.) That is ultimately due to the general
social utility of clear communication, but it does not follow that it is due
solely to “social reasons” rather than “linguistic” ones.23 Considerations
of social utility have helped to shape our conception of what utterances
mean. We conceive of the meaning of utterances as something
essentially public, and not, like desires, pains or other mental states, as
something essentially private of which we can have only indirect
evidence. We do so partly because it is important for many practical
purposes that utterances have meanings that are essentially public.
In matters such as these, the ultimate court of appeal must be our
linguistic judgments. Because our language is a social artifact, constituted
by our shared practices, there is nothing beyond them that can settle
disagreement. “[A]ll we have to go on is our use of language and such
knowledge as we may possess about the conventions on which we
rely . . . .”24 The question, then, is whether most people would agree
with my judgment, which is that the groom not only appeared to make
the promise, but did make it, even though he did not intend to. I think
they would. It seems to me a commonplace that the meaning people
intend to express or imply can differ from the meaning they in fact
express or imply. People can intend to say or imply something but fail
to do so, and conversely, they can say or imply something they did not
intend. If we are told that we have misunderstood someone’s utterance,
we often defend ourselves by replying “I now realize what she meant to
say, but it’s not what she did say,” or “He may not have intended to say
that, but he did.” Knapp and Michaels would presumably deny that such
replies can be strictly correct: if the meaning of someone’s words is
23. Knapp concedes this in Steven Knapp, Practice, Purpose, and Interpretive
Controversy, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY 323, 334 (Michael Brint & William
Weaver eds., 1991).
24. Ralph C.S. Walker, Conversational Implicatures, in MEANING, REFERENCE
AND NECESSITY: NEW STUDIES IN SEMANTICS 133, 177 (Simon Blackburn ed., 1975).
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identical to the meaning she intends them to have, then she can only
appear to, but cannot really, say things which do not mean what she
intends them to mean. This strikes me, and I am confident would strike
most people, as counterintuitive.
IV. INTENTIONLESS MEANINGS AND MEANINGLESS INTENTIONS
Knapp and Michaels’s main argument against conventionalism is that
marks do not mean anything if they were not made with the intention
that they mean something, even if they resemble an utterance in every
other respect. Thus, suppose we find some marks that look like a word
(say, “HELP” on a sandy beach), and the only evidence available to us
suggests that they are in fact words, inscribed intentionally by someone
in order to communicate something (for example, there are footprints
leading to and from them). In reality, however, the marks were not inscribed
by anyone, but were produced by an unthinking, natural process (the
presence of footprints is coincidental). Knapp and Michaels would
argue that the marks are really meaningless, even if the only evidence
available to us suggests that they are not. We are justified in believing
that they are meaningful, but our belief is mistaken none the less. For
the sake of argument, I will assume that this argument is sound.
But now consider the converse hypothetical. We find some marks
which bear some resemblance to a word, but the only evidence available
to us suggests that they are meaningless, the product of an unthinking,
natural process. In reality, they were inscribed by someone intending to
write the word that they resemble, in order to convey a message to us,
not someone else whose language we are unable to recognize. Do the
marks really form that word, and have its meaning, or are they
meaningless because, given the only evidence available to us, we are
unable to regard them as meaningful?
It might be argued that this hypothetical should be answered in the
same way as the previous one. Knapp and Michaels’s argument, which I
am assuming is sound, is that meaninglessness is something objective,
independent of the evidence we may have for ascertaining it. If marks
were not produced by a purposeful intelligence intending them to mean
something, then they are meaningless whatever we may justifiably
believe given the evidence available to us. If we are prepared to believe
this, it might be argued, we should also believe that whether marks are
meaningful is also an objective fact independent of the evidence we, as
their intended audience, may have for ascertaining it. In other words, it
might be argued that Knapp and Michaels’s principal argument against
conventionalism does indeed support strong intentionalism, the thesis
that the meaning of a text is its speaker’s meaning regardless of what
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evidence of that meaning is available to his intended audience.
But it seems to me that meaninglessness and meaningfulness differ in
this respect, even if Knapp and Michaels are right about the former. As
for meaningfulness, someone who fails to produce something that his
intended audience can recognize as meaningful, given the evidence
readily available to it, fails to produce anything meaningful, notwithstanding
his intention to do so.
But how can there be a difference in this respect between meaninglessness
and meaningfulness, which might seem to be opposite sides of the same
coin? The answer is that even if Knapp and Michaels’s principal argument
is right, two necessary conditions must be satisfied for marks to be
meaningful. First, the marks must have been made by someone with the
intention that they be meaningful;25 and secondly, her intended audience
must be capable of recognizing that fact. The failure of either of these
two conditions makes marks meaningless. Knapp and Michaels insist
against conventionalists that the first condition is necessary, but it does
not follow that it is also sufficient, for marks to be meaningful. Marks
made with the intention that they be meaningful are not meaningful
unless the second condition is also satisfied. But if the existence of an
author who intends her text to have a meaning is only one of two
necessary conditions for the text to have a meaning, then intended
meaning and textual meaning are not identical, and strong intentionalism
is false.
Knapp and Michaels argue that there cannot be textual meaning
without an intention to create it, but they do not seem to consider
whether there can be an intention to create it that does not succeed.26 I
have argued that even if there cannot be intentionless meanings, there
can be meaningless intentions. And if something intended to be
meaningful can be meaningless, then for the same reasons, something
intended to mean one thing can mean something else.

25. Or they must be suitably related to marks made by someone with the intention
that they be meaningful. For example, the marks you are reading were produced by a
printing press, but they are suitably related to marks I made with the intention that they
be meaningful. See George M. Wilson, Again, Theory: On Speaker’s Meaning, Linguistic
Meaning, and the Meaning of a Text, 19 CRITICAL INQUIRY 164, 168 n.4 (1992).
26. In arguing against theory, they say, “the only important question about
intention is whether there can in fact be intentionless meanings.” Knapp & Michaels,
supra note 15, at 15.
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V. MULTIPLE MEANINGS?
Moderate intentionalism is the thesis that the meaning of an utterance
is the meaning which evidence readily available to its intended audience
suggests it was intended to mean. An arguably counterintuitive
consequence of this thesis is that an utterance may have more than one
meaning, because different evidence of the speaker’s intended meaning
may be available to different members of his intended audience.
For example, if I intend a remark made during a conversation with
Bob and Joe to be a joke, Bob might understand this but Joe might not.
Joe might take it to be an insult, not through any fault of his, but because
I failed to appreciate that he does not know me as well as Bob, and
therefore needs more clues of my jocular intention. According to the
moderate intentionalist, my remark has two meanings: it means one
thing in the case of Bob, and another in the case of Joe, because they do
not have ready access to the same evidence of my intention.27
It may seem odd to think that the remark has two different meanings.
Do we not intuitively feel that it really was a joke, which Bob was able to
understand but Joe was not? But if so, its meaning must be independent
of the evidence available to its intended audience. If the remark was a
joke, regardless of Joe’s inability to recognize it as such, then presumably
it would also have been a joke even if I had been conversing only with
him: why should Bob’s presence make any difference? But that would
seem to vindicate strong intentionalism: the meaning of my utterance
would be whatever I intended, regardless of the ability of my intended
audience to ascertain that intention.
On the other hand, is it so odd that an utterance might have more than one
meaning? That would surely be possible even if strong intentionalism were
true, because I might have intended my remark as an insult to Joe and also,
unknown to him, a joke for Bob’s amusement.28 Strong intentionalists hold
that an utterance means what its speaker intends it to mean, and so if I
intend an utterance simultaneously to convey different meanings to different
people, they must hold that it has different meanings.29
27. Moreover, if an utterance can have two different meanings at the time it is uttered,
then it can have different meanings at different times. A text might be correctly interpreted to
mean one thing shortly after it is written, but something else a hundred years later when
readers no longer know facts relevant to its interpretation. In the case of a novel or a
constitution, later readers are as much members of the text’s intended audience as earlier ones.
So moderate intentionalism might support Gadamer against Knapp and Michaels, insofar as it
endorses the notion that the meaning of a text can change over time.
28. This need not be a case of an express meaning being accompanied by an
implication: both the joke and the insult might be implications.
29. Knapp and Michaels therefore seem to be mistaken to assert that “a text has
only one meaning.” Knapp & Michaels, supra note 6, at 68.
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Seen in this light, the consequence that an utterance might have more
than one meaning is less damaging to the plausibility of moderate
intentionalism. Admittedly, moderate intentionalists would be committed to
the coexistence of different meanings more often than strong intentionalists,
because differences in the evidence readily available to members of
intended audiences are more common than deliberate multiple meanings.
But that seems far from decisive in the contest between moderate and
strong intentionalism. It is just one consideration to be weighed against
others, many of which, I have argued, favor moderate intentionalism.
VI. FOREIGN LANGUAGES AND PRIVATE CODES
When I raised the possibility of moderate intentionalism at the
Conference on Legal Interpretation, Michaels replied that if someone
spoke in French to people who did not understand that language, the
meaning of her utterance would be its meaning in French, even though
evidence of that meaning would not be readily available to her
intended audience. It might seem to follow that if someone spoke in
an idiolect to people who did not understand it, the meaning of his
utterance would be its meaning in that idiolect, even though evidence
of that meaning would not be readily available to his intended audience.
It might then seem to follow that, contrary to the argument I have put
forward here, the meaning of an utterance is independent of whether or
not it is readily accessible by its intended audience, and therefore that
strong intentionalism is vindicated.
But if someone speaks to us in a language we do not understand, it is
obvious to us that we do not understand it. We reasonably suppose that
it has a meaning, even though we do not immediately know what it is.
(It is possible, of course, that we are the victims of a hoax, and that the
utterance is really nonsense.) Moreover, we can attempt to identify the
language used, and if we succeed in doing so, to consult a dictionary or
translator to ascertain the meaning of the utterance. We are like people
who must decipher a coded message, with the assistance of a manual
that explains it. Even the intended recipients of a coded message, and
not just enemies who have intercepted it, may have to do so. This is
consistent with the definition of utterance meaning stipulated in Part II.
Utterance meaning is “what the speaker’s meaning appears to be, given
all the evidence that is readily available to his intended audience, which
may include the sentence meaning of the utterance and other clues such
as its context.” In the case of a coded message, the evidence of its
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intended meaning—the manual—is readily available to its intended
recipients.
If a person speaks in a language that his intended audience does not
understand, the audience will have to consult a dictionary or translator to
decipher its meaning. It might in some cases seem implausible to
describe such assistance in ascertaining its meaning as “readily”
available to the audience, but this is no different in principle from the
use of a code. Perhaps the criterion of “ready availability” needs to be
relaxed in such cases. But the need to seek such assistance would be
obvious. Members of the audience would know that the utterance had a
meaning that was, temporarily, inaccessible or obscure to them.
Cases of this kind stand in sharp contrast with the hypothetical case in
which a person appears to speak to us in our own language, but later
claims to have used a private code, and to have meant something
entirely different from the meaning we reasonably attributed to his
utterance. Assume that at the time we interpret his utterance, there is
no evidence whatsoever to alert us to his use of a private code. When
he later explains what, in his private code, he meant, we are entitled to
reply that although this may have been what he meant, it was not the
meaning of what he said. The same is true, on a smaller scale, of an
utterance that is in our language, but fails accurately to communicate
the speaker’s meaning because (unbeknownst to us) he has misused the
language, or for some other reason has failed to provide us with
adequate evidence of his meaning. In such cases it is also reasonable for
us to say, “We now know what you meant, but that is not (the meaning
of) what you said.”
VII. CONCLUSION
Knapp and Michaels are at best half right. I have assumed that they
are right to argue against conventionalists that a necessary condition for
marks to have a meaning is that the marks be made by someone
intending them to have it. But they are nevertheless wrong to infer from
this that the meaning of marks is identical to whatever meaning they
were intended to have. This is because the existence of an intended
meaning, even if necessary, is not a sufficient condition for marks to
have a meaning. It follows that it is not a sufficient condition for the
marks to have that particular meaning.
In Alice in Wonderland, Humpty Dumpty says that his words mean
whatever he intends them to mean. Knapp and Michaels agree.30 Humpty
30. “The antiformalist point of ‘Against Theory’ is to insist that anything can be
used to mean anything or, as Crewe rightly puts it, ‘quite radically to deny that the forms
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and Knapp and Michaels are right, but only up to a point. We can use
words to mean whatever we intend them to mean, but only if our
intended audience has sufficient nonverbal evidence of our intention to
do so. The problem is that the totality of the evidence available to our
audience, verbal and nonverbal, cannot convey whatever we intend it to
convey. Because our audience must have evidence that it can understand,
our attempt to convey our intentions is subject to constraints that must be
respected if we are to succeed. Those constraints determine the meaning of
our utterances whatever our intentions might be.
Moderate intentionalism lies somewhere between strong intentionalism
and conventionalism. It is able to explain why courts of law do not
regard themselves as bound either by the literal (“sentence”) meanings
of a statute, or by subjective intentions that legislators (even if they
constitute a majority) failed to communicate to their intended audience.
The courts seek to give effect to the objective meaning of a statute,
which is informed both by the linguistic conventions that determine
literal meanings, and by other evidence of the legislature’s intentions,
provided that it is readily available to the statute’s intended audience.
That other evidence can include common sense understandings of the
legislature’s probable purposes and intentions, the historical circumstances
in which the statute was enacted, and (to a limited extent) legislative
history.31

of language possess any defining power.’” Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, A
Reply to Our Critics, in AGAINST THEORY: LITERARY STUDIES AND THE NEW PRAGMATISM,
95, 104 n.6 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1985); see also Knapp, supra note 23, at 323.
31. See also Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Legislative Intentions, Legislative Supremacy,
and Legal Positivism, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 493 (2005).
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